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Abstract
Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but
strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive
proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing.
Existing interactive-proof games largely fall into two categories: either as games of coopera-
tion such as multi-prover interactive proofs and cooperative rational proofs, where the provers
work together as a team; or as games of conflict such as refereed games, where the provers
directly compete with each other in a zero-sum game. Neither of these extremes truly capture
the strategic nature of service providers in outsourcing applications. How to design and analyze
non-cooperative interactive proofs is an important open problem.
In this paper, we introduce a mechanism-design approach to define a multi-prover interactive-
proof model in which the provers are rational and non-cooperative—they act to maximize their
expected utility given others’ strategies. We define a strong notion of backwards induction as
our solution concept to analyze the resulting extensive-form game with imperfect information.
Our protocols provide utility gap guarantees, which are analogous to soundness gap in classic
interactive proofs. At a high level, a utility gap of u means that the protocol is robust against
provers that may not care about a utility loss of 1/u.
We fully characterize the complexity of our proof system under different utility gap guaran-
tees. For example, we show that with a polynomial utility gap, the power of non-cooperative
rational interactive proofs is exactly PNEXP.
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1 Introduction
Game theory has played a central role in analyzing the conflict and cooperation in interactive
proof games. These games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful
but strategic agents, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. The
extensive study of these games over decades has fueled our understanding of important complexity
classes (e.g., [4, 18, 24–26, 28, 29, 42]. From a modern perspective, these games capture the essence
of computation outsourcing—the honest party is a client outsourcing his computation to powerful
rational service providers in exchange for money.
In this paper, we consider a natural type of interactive-proof game. For the moment, let us
call our client Arthur. Arthur hires a service provider Merlin to solve a computational problem
for him, and hires a second service provider Megan to cross-check Merlin’s answer. Arthur wants
the game (and associated payments) to be designed such that if Merlin gives the correct answer,
Megan agrees with him; however, if Merlin cheats and gives a wrong answer, Megan is incentivized
to contradict him, informing Arthur of Merlin’s dishonesty. This means that Merlin and Megan
are not purely cooperative nor purely competitive. Each is simply a rational agent who wants to
maximize their own utility.
This is a mechanism design problem—how can Arthur incentivize non-cooperative rational
agents (Merlin and Megan) to give truthful answers to his questions, helping him solve a compu-
tational problem? This problem is the focus of our paper.
Structure of the game. We borrow the structure and terminology of interactive proofs [3,7,32],
as was done in previous work on rational proofs [1,2,20,34] and refereed games [18,24,28,40,45]. We
call Arthur the verifier and assume that he is computationally bounded (he may be probabilistic,
but must run in polynomial time). Arthur’s coin flips are treated as Nature moves in the game.
We call Merlin and Megan the provers; they have unbounded computational power.
The verifier exchanges messages with the provers in order to determine the answer to a decision
problem. The exchange proceeds in rounds: in a round, either a verifier sends a message to all
provers or receives a response from each. The provers cannot observe the messages exchanged
between the verifier and other provers.
At the end, the verifier gives a payment to each prover. Our goal is to design protocols and
payments such that, under an appropriate solution concept of the resulting game, the provers’ best
strategies lead the verifier to the correct answer.
The interactive protocols described above form an extensive-form game of imperfect information.
To analyze them, we essentially use a strong notion of backward induction as our solution concept.
We refine it further by eliminating strategies that are weakly dominated on “subgames” within the
entire game. We defined the solution concept formally in Section 2.1.
Comparison to previous work. The model of our games is based on interactive proof systems [3,
32], in which a verifier exchanges messages with untrustworty provers and at the end either accepts
or rejects their claim. Interactive proofs guarantee that, roughly speaking, the verifier accepts a
truthful claim with probability at least 2/3 (completeness) and no strategy of the provers can
make the verifier accept a false claim with probability more than 1/3 (soundness).
The study of interactive proofs has found extensive applications in both theory and practice.
Classical results on IPs have led us to better understand complexity classes through characteri-
zations such as IP = PSPACE [42, 48] and MIP = NEXP [4, 25, 29], and later led to the important
area of probabilistically checkable proofs [49]. More recently, the study of IPs has resulted in
extremely efficient (e.g., near linear or even logarithmic time) protocols for delegation of computa-
tion [8, 10, 17, 33, 46]. Such super-efficient IPs have brought theory closer to practice, resulting in
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“nearly-practical” systems (e.g., see [9, 15,50,53]).
Indeed, interactive proofs are not only a fundamental theoretical concept but an indispensable
framework to design efficient computation-outsourcing protocols.
Existing interactive-proof games. Interactive-proof systems with multiple provers have largely
been studied as games that fall into two categories: either as games of cooperation such as MIP [7],
cooperative multi-prover rational proofs (MRIP) [20], and variants [4, 12, 29, 33, 38], where the
provers work together to convince the verifier of their joint claim; or as games of conflict such as
refereed games [16–18,24,26,28,39], where the provers directly compete with each other to convince
the verifier of their conflicting claims.
Both of these categories have limitations. In a game of cooperation, provers cannot be leveraged
directly against each other. That is, the verifier cannot directly ask one prover if another prover
is lying. On the other hand, in a game of conflict, such as refereed games, one prover must “win”
the zero-sum game. Thus, such games need to assume that at least one prover—who must be
the winning prover in a correct protocol—can be trusted to always tell the truth. Despite their
limitations, both models have proved to be fundamental constructs not only to understand and
characterize important complexity classes [4,18,20,24,28], but also to design efficient computation
outsourcing protocols [8, 9, 16,17,33].
We call our model non-cooperative rational interactive proofs (ncRIP) as it applies a
non-cooperative game-theory approach to both interactive proofs and rational proofs.
1.1 An Example Protocol Using Non-Cooperative Provers
We illustrate the benefits of a non-cooperative approach with a simple example protocol for the
NP-complete problem Graph-Coloring. In particular, given a graph G on n vertices, a O(log n)-time
verifier V wants to determine if G is 3-colorable by interacting with two provers P1 and P2.
P1
P1 ←$1
P2 ←$1
G is not3-colorable
V P2
V checks if
c(vi) = c(vj),
ek = (vi, vj)
P1 ←$2
P2 ←$0
P
2 is wrong
P1 ←$0
P2 ←$2P2 is
corre
ct
no; c(v
i ) = c(v
j )
on edge e
k = (v
i , v
j )
P1 ← $2
P2 ←$1
yesis A a valid
3-coloring?
G is
3-co
lora
ble
A =
(c(v1
), c(
v2),
. . .)
Figure 1: A simple protocol for 3-coloring.
V asks prover P1 is G is 3-colorable, if P1 says no, he gets $1, if he says yes he must send V
a valid coloring A = (v1, c(v1), . . . , (vn, c(vn)). Without looking at A, V asks prover P2 if A is a
valid coloring. If P2 says yes, he gets $1; if he says no he must point out an edge e = (vi, vj) that is
colored incorrectly, that is, c(vi) = c(vj) in A. V checks two indices in A in O(log n) time to verify
the colors of vi and vj . If P2 is right he gets $2 for informing on P1; P1 gets $0 for lying. If P2 is
wrong, he gets $0 for lying and P1 gets $2 because P2 was unable to disprove him.
We analyze (somewhat informally) the game resulting from the above protocol using backward
induction.1 The last move is made by P2. If A is a valid coloring, then it is in P2’s best interest
to agree with P1 and get $1, otherwise he will only get $0. On the other hand, if A is an invalid
coloring, it is in P2’s best interest to contradict P1, produce an incorrectly colored edge and obtain
1While backward induction or “subgame perfection” is sufficient to analyze this game of perfect information,
in Section 2.1 we discuss how we handle imperfect information and behavior on an extended notion of subgames.
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$2, which is more than the $1 he gets by agreeing with P1. Given P2’s best response, we analyze P1’s
move. If G is 3-colorable, P1’s best response is to be truthful, produce a valid coloring and obtain
$2 (as P2 will agree with him on a valid coloring), instead of the $1 he gets by lying. Similarly, if
G is not 3-colorable, P1’s best response is to be truthful and just accept $1, because otherwise P2
will inform V about the invalid coloring and he would get $0.
We want to highlight that the above protocol directly incentivizes P2 to agree with P1’s correct
answer and disagree with P1’s incorrect answer, in a way that would not be possible in a game of
cooperation or a game of conflict. This leads to more direct incentives (and, in our eyes, simpler
protocols) than protocols for similar problems with cooperative rational provers [21].
1.2 Contributions and Results
In this paper, we introduce a new interactive-proof game, non-cooperative rational interactive proofs
(ncRIP). This model generalizes multi-prover rational proofs [21].
Solution concept for ncRIP. We define a refinement of sequential equilibrium, strong sequential
equilibrium (SSE), that essentially says that players’ beliefs about the histories that led them to an
unreachable information set should be irrelevant to their best response. From a mechanism design
perspective, we want to design the protocols and payments that allow this strong guarantee to
hold—letting the players’ best response be the same, no matter their beliefs.2
To eliminate SSE strategies that are weakly dominated in “subgames” of the extensive-form
game, we define a backward-induction-compatible notion of dominance. Roughly speaking, we say
a protocol is a ncRIP if there exists a strategy profile of the provers that is a dominant SSE among
the subforms of the extensive form game, and under this strategy the provers’ lead the verifier to
the correct answer. We define the model formally in Section 2.
Utility Gap for Non-Cooperative Provers. Utility gap is a fundamental concept for rational
proofs [2,20,34] which is analogous to soundness gap in interactive proofs. It measures how robust
a protocol is against the provers’ possible deviations from the desired strategy.
This notion is straightforward to define for cooperative rational protocols—they have a utility
gap of u if the total expected payment decreases by 1/u whenever the provers report the wrong
answer. In non-cooperative protocols, however, it is not a priori clear how to define such a payment
loss or to choose which prover should incur the loss. A payment loss solely imposed on the total
payment may not prevent some provers from deviating, and a loss solely imposed on the provers’
final payments may not prevent them from deviating within subgames.
We define a meaningful notion of utility gap for ncRIP that is naturally incorporated in a
backward-induction-compatible way to the dominant SSE concept.
Tight Characterizations of ncRIP Classes. In this paper, we completely characterize the
power of non-cooperative rational proofs under different utility-gap guarantees.
We construct ncRIP protocols with constant, polynomial, and exponential utility gaps for pow-
erful (and tight) complexity classes, demonstrating the strength of our solution concept. Our
protocols are simple and intuitive (requiring only a few careful tweaks from their cooperative coun-
terparts), and are thus easy to explain and implement. However, proving their correctness involves
analyzing the extensive-game involving subtle details of beliefs to show that the protocol meets the
strong solution-concept and utility-gap requirements.
We then prove tight upper bounds for all three ncRIP classes. Proving tight upper bounds is
the most technically challenging part of the paper. We prove the upper bounds by simulating the
2We believe that SSE is of independent interest as a solution concept for designing extensive-form mechanisms
(e.g. [23,31,51]). In Appendix B, we prove important properties of SSE that may prove useful in future studies.
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decisions of the verifier and provers with a Turing Machine, but there are several obstacles to attain
the bounds in Figure 2. For example, the dominance condition means that an NEXP oracle cannot
itself verify dominant SSEs. Furthermore, the polynomial randomness of the verifier can induce an
exponential-sized game tree; too large to be verified by the polynomial-time machine in Theorems 1
and 2. The key lemma that helps us overcome these challenges is the pruning lemma (Lemma 13).
At a high level, it shows how we can prune the nature moves of the verifier in the resulting game
tree, while preserving the dominant-SSE and utility-gap guarantees.
Our results are summarized in Figure 2, where we use O(1)-ncRIP, poly(n)-ncRIP and
exp(n)-ncRIP to denote ncRIP classes with constant, polynomial and exponential utility gaps re-
spectively. The notations are analogous for MRIP (the cooperative variant). We characterize ncRIP
classes via oracle Turing machines. In particular, PNEXP[O(1)] is the class of languages decided by
a polynomial-time Turing machine that makes O(1) queries to an NEXP oracle, and EXPpoly-NEXP
is the class decided by an exponential-time Turing machine with polynomial-length queries to an
NEXP oracle. (Unlike the non-adaptive variant, this class is not known to be equivalent to EXPNP).
Theorem 1. O(1)-ncRIP = PNEXP[O(1)]
Theorem 2. poly(n)-ncRIP = PNEXP
Theorem 3. exp(n)-ncRIP = EXPpoly-NEXP
Corollary 4. O(1)-ncRIP = O(1)-MRIP
Corollary 5. poly(n)-ncRIP ⊇ poly(n)-MRIP
Corollary 6. exp(n)-ncRIP = exp(n)-MRIP
Figure 2: Summary of our results.
Power of Non-Cooperative vs. Cooperative and Competitive Provers. Interestingly, in
the case of constant and exponential utility gap, the power of ncRIP and MRIP coincides. This
can be explained by the power of adaptive versus non-adaptive queries in oracle Turing machines.
Indeed, our results reveal the main difference between non-cooperative and cooperative provers:
the former can be used to handle adaptive oracle queries, the latter cannot (see [19,20]). Intuitively,
this makes sense—cooperative provers may collude across adaptive queries, answering some of them
incorrectly to gain on future queries. On the other hand, non-cooperativeness allows us to treat
the subgame involving the oracle queries as a separate game from the rest.
Our results also show that non-cooperative provers are more powerful than competing provers—
the power of refereed games with imperfect information and perfect recall is equal to EXP [24].
MRIP vs. ncRIP protocols. The ncRIP protocols presented in this paper (e.g., Figure 4)
are largely the same as those given by Chen et al. for MRIP protocols [20]—this is somewhat
unsurprising as both are tailored tightly to a circuit representation of the classes in Figure 2.
However, the techniques used in the analysis are substantially different. The proofs in this
paper require careful analysis of the information-set structure, and subtleties of identifying when
they form proper “subgames.”3 On the other hand, ncRIP protocols and proofs are in some places
much more intuitive—for example, they let us avoid the difficult and somewhat artificial payment
scaling between rounds, often required in RIP and MRIP [1,20,34].
2 Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proofs
In this section we introduce the model for ncRIP.
Notation. First, we review the structure of ncRIP protocols and related notation; this is largely the
same as [20]. We review the concepts of extensive-form games in the context of ncRIP in Section A.
3For example, proving correctness of the ncRIP protocol for NEXP requires “opening the box”of the MIP protocol
(see the proof of Lemma 10).
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The decision problem being solved by an interactive proof is modeled as whether a given string
x is in the given language L. An interactive protocol is a pair (V, ~P ), where V is the verifier ,
~P = (P1, . . . , Pp(n)) is the vector of p(n) provers, where p(n) is polynomial in n = |x|. The verifier
runs in polynomial time and flips private coins. Each Pi is computationally unbounded. The verifier
and provers are given the input x. The verifier can communicate with each prover privately, but
no two provers can communicate with each other once the protocol begins.
In a round , either each prover sends a message to V , or V sends a message to each prover, and
these two cases alternate. The length of each message ℓ(n), and the number of rounds k(n) are
both polynomial in n. The final transcript ~m of the protocol is a random variable depending on r,
the random string used by V . At the end of the communication, the verifier computes an answer
bit c ∈ {0, 1} for the membership of x in L based on x, r, and ~m. V also computes a payment
vector ~R = (R1, R2, . . . , Rp(n)), where Ri is the payment given to Pi, Ri ∈ [−1, 1], and the total∑p(n)
i=1 Ri ∈ [−1, 1] as well.
4 The protocol and the payment function ~R are public knowledge.
Each prover Pi’s strategy at round j maps the transcript seen at the beginning of round j to
the message he sends in that round. Let si = (si1, . . . , sik(n)) be the strategy of prover Pi, and
s = (s1, . . . , sp(n)) be the strategy profile of the provers. Given input x, and strategy profile
s, let uk(x, s, (V, ~P )) denote the expected payment of prover Pk in the protocol (V, ~P ) based on
randomness r, input x and s; if (V, ~P ) is clear from context, we shorten this to uk(x, s).
The protocol forms an extensive-form game with imperfect information (see Appendix A
for more details) and should be designed such that the provers are incentivized to reach an equi-
librium that leads V to the correct answer bit c. We formalize the solution concept next.
2.1 Solution concept for ncRIP
We want the solution concept for ncRIP to satisfy a strong notion of backward induction [44], a
standard criterion applied to extensive-form games based on the common knowledge of rationality.
Backwards induction refers to the condition of being “sequentially rational” in an extensive-form
game, that is, each player must play his best response at each node where he has to move, even if
his rationality implies that such a node will not be reached.
If an interactive protocol forms an extensive-form game of perfect information, it is easy to
formalize this condition. A strategy s is sequentially rational or satisfies backward induction ,
if for every player i and every decision node of i, conditioned on reaching the decision node, si is a
best response to s−i. In other words, s induces a best response at every subgame.
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In a game of imperfect information, the decisions nodes corresponding to a player’s turn are
partitioned into information sets, where the player is unable to distinguish between the possible
histories within an information set. To reason about sequential rationality we now need a probability
distribution uI on each information set I, so as to determine the players’ expected utility conditioned
on reaching I and thus their best response at I under s. The probability distribution µI is referred
to as the player’s beliefs about the potential histories leading to I.
The beliefs uI at reachable information sets (reached with non-zero probability under s)
are derived from s using Bayes’ rule; this is a standard derivation used in most solution concepts
for extensive-form games [44]. We sometimes write µsI to emphasize that the beliefs depend on s.
4Negative payments are used to reflect that the provers are being punished. They can be shifted and scaled to lie
in [0, 1]. Similarly, we may allow V ’s total budget to be a larger constant for simplicity as it can be scaled down.
5A subgame is a subtree that can be treated as a separate well-defined game. In a perfect-information game, every
node starts a new subgame. “Backward induction” and “subgame-perfect equilibrium” are used interchangeably in
the literature [31].
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Past work has introduced a variety of methods for defining the beliefs usI at unreachable
information sets (i.e. those reached with probability zero under s); see e.g. [22, 41, 43, 47]. The
most well-known is sequential equilibrium [41], which demands an explicit system of beliefs that
satisfies a (somewhat artificial) consistency condition. Other equilibria, like trembling hand [47],
reason implicitly about beliefs at unreachable information sets by assigning a negligible probability
with which the player’s hand “trembles,” and reaches an otherwise-unreachable information set.
Further refinements of these take the structure and payoffs of the game into account [5, 22,43].
The treatment of beliefs at unreachable information sets in these solution concepts is often fo-
cused on ensuring that they can be used to analyze every extensive-form game. From a mechanism-
design perspective, our focus is different—we want the solution concept that provides strong guar-
antees on the behavior of the players, even if it cannot be used to analyze every game.
At a high-level, we want the players’ beliefs to be irrelevant in determining their best response.
We call this notion strong sequential rationality . A strategy profile s is strongly sequentially
rational if for every information set I, conditioned on reaching I, si is a best response to s−i
with respect to µsI , where µ
s
I is derived using Bayes’s if I is reachable under s, and otherwise µ
s
I
is any arbitrary probability distribution. At an unreachable information set I, this requirement is
equivalent to saying that si must be a best response to s−i conditioned on reaching each history
h ∈ I. We say a strategy profile is a strong sequential equilibrium (SSE) if it satisfies strong
sequential rationality.6
We refine our solution concept further to eliminate SSEs that are weakly dominated on
“subgames” from consideration. We impose this dominance condition in a backward-induction-
compatible way. Since imperfect-information games may have very few proper subgames, we use
the generalized notion of subforms by Kreps and Wilson [41].
To review the definition of subforms, we need further notation. LetH be the set of all valid histo-
ries of the game. For a history h ∈ H, let I(h) be the unique information set containing h. Let FI be
the set of all information sets following I (including I), i.e., FI = {I(h
′, h) | h′ ∈ I, (h′, h) ∈ H}.
For an information set I, let HI be the set of all histories following I. HI is a subform rooted
at I if for every I ′ ∈ FI and every hˆ ∈ FI , ∃h
′ ∈ I and ∃h ∈ HI such that hˆ = (h
′, h).
Roughly speaking, a subform HI completely contains all the information sets following I, so
there is no information asymmetry between the players acting within HI .
Given a strategy profile, subform HI and the probability distribution µ
s
I on I together can be
treated as a well-defined game. We say an SSE s weakly dominates another SSE s′ if, for any
player i, µi(s) ≥ µi(s
′). A strategy s is weakly dominant if it dominates all SSEs.
We say a SSE s weakly dominates SSE s′ on a subform HI if, for any player j acting in HI , the
expected utility of j under sI in the game (HI , µ
s
I) is greater than or equal to their utility under
s′I in the game (HI , µ
s′
I ). We eliminate weakly dominated strategies as follows.
Definition 7 (Dominant Strong Sequential Equilibrium). A strategy profile s is a dominant strong
sequential equilibrium if s is a SSE and
• for every subform HI of height 1: s weakly dominates s’ on HI for any SSE s
′
• for every subform HI subgame of height > 1: s weakly dominates s
′ on HI for any SSE s
′ that
is a dominant SSE in all subforms of height at most h− 1.
We are ready to define rational proofs with non-cooperative provers.
Definition 8 (Non-Cooperative Rational Interactive Proof). Fix an arbitrary string x and language
L. An interactive protocol (V, ~P ) is a non-cooperative rational interactive proof (ncRIP) protocol
6In Section B, we show that SSEs, a refinement of sequential equilibrium, admit several useful properties.
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for L if there exists a strategy profile s of the provers that is a dominant SSE in the resulting
extensive-form game, and under any dominant SSE, the answer bit c output by the verifier is
correct (i.e., c = 1 iff x ∈ L) with probability 1, where the probability is taken over the verifier’s
randomness.
2.2 Utility Gap in ncRIP Protocols
The notion of dominant SSE provides a strong guarantee that rational non-cooperative provers will
act as prescribed by the protocol and lead the verifier to the correct answer. However, this is only
true in the classic game-theoretic sense where the players are perfectly rational and “sensitive” to
arbitrarily small utility losses. In reality, some provers may not care about small payment losses.
Such provers could still deviate to lead the verifier to the wrong answer. To make ncRIP protocols
robust against such “insensitive” provers, we define the notion of utility gap. Informally, a utility
gap of u means that if a strategy profile s leads the verifier to the wrong answer, there must exist a
subform, such that some provers must lose at least a 1/u amount in their final individual payments
(compared to the strategy where they do their best in that subform). As a consequence, these
provers will not deviate to s, as long as they care about 1/u payment losses.7
Definition 9. Let (V, ~P ) be an ncRIP protocol for a language L and s∗ be a dominant SSE of the
resulting game. The protocol (V, ~P ) has an α(n)-utility gap or α(n)-gap, if for any strategy profile
s′ under which the answer bit c′ is wrong, there exists a subform HI reachable under s
′, and a
prover Pj acting in HI who has deviated from s
∗ such that
uj(x, (s
′
−I , s
∗
I), (V, ~P ))− uj(x, (s
′
−I , s
′
I), (V, ~P )) > 1/α(n),
where s′−I denotes the strategy profile s
′ outside subform HI , that is, s
′
−I = s
′ \ s′I .
The class of languages that have an ncRIP protocol with constant , polynomial and expo-
nential utility gap, are denoted by O(1)-ncRIP, poly(n)-ncRIP, and exp(n)-ncRIP respectively.8
Note that these terms refer to α(n), so exponential gives the weakest gap guarantees.
3 Lower Bounds: ncRIP Protocols with Utility Gap
In this section, we give an O(1)-utility gap ncRIP protocol for the class NEXP and use it to give
an O(α(n))-utility gap ncRIP protocol for the class PNEXP[α(n)]. Setting α(n) to be a constant or
polynomial in n gives us PNEXP[O(1)] ⊆ O(1)-ncRIP and PNEXP ⊆ poly(n)-ncRIP respectively. Lastly,
we show how to simulate any cooperative multi-prover rational interactive proof (MRIP) using an
ncRIP protocol with exponential utility gap.
We denote Turning machines with non-adaptive access to an oracle by using || in the subscript:
for example, PNEXP|| . Note that this is sometimes denoted P
||NEXP in the literature. Since EXPNP|| ⊆
MRIP, and EXPNP|| = EXP
poly−NEXP [20], this proves that EXPpoly−NEXP ⊆ exp(n)-ncRIP.
Here we argue correctness of our protocols at a high level; see Section C for full proofs.
7Utility gap is analogous to soundness gap—the difference between completeness and soundness—in interactive
proofs. If an IP protocol has a large soundness gap, then the probability that malicious provers can make the verifier
accept when x /∈ L is low. Similarly, if an ncRIP protocol has a large utility gap, then even provers who are not
sensitive to small losses will not have an incentive to deviate and lead the verifier to the wrong answer.
8These classes are formally defined by taking the union over languages with α(n) utility gap, for every α(n) that
is constant, polynomial and exponential in n respectively.
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Constant-gap ncRIP protocol for NEXP. The ncRIP protocol for any language in NEXP is
in Figure 3.9 While the protocol is simple and uses the 2-prover 1-round MIP for NEXP [25] as
a blackbox, in the analysis we have to open up the black-box. In particular, if P1 sends c = 0 in
round 1, all the information sets of P1 and P2 in round 3 become unreachable. To show that a SSE
exists, we need to show that the provers have a best response at these unreachable sets, which is
argued based on the messages exchanged in the MIP procotol.
This protocol is a good example to highlight the differences between ncRIP and MRIP
protocols—the ncRIP protocol appears almost identical to the MRIP protocol for NEXP [20]. How-
ever, the analyses are significantly different—the correctness of the MRIP protocol follows almost
immediately from that of the blackbox MIP protocol, while in the case of ncRIP we have to prove
that the protocol meets all the conditions of dominant SSE.
Lemma 10. Any language L ∈ NEXP has a 2-prover 3-round 6/5-gap ncRIP protocol.
For any input x and language L ∈ NEXP, the protocol (V, P1, P2) for L is:
1. P1 sends a bit c to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. If c = 0, then the protocol ends and the payments are R1 = R2 = 1/2.
3. Otherwise, V runs the classic 2-prover 1-round MIP protocol for NEXP with P1 and P2 to
prove if x ∈ L. If the MIP protocol accepts then R1 = 1, R2 = 1; else, R1 = −1, R2 = −1.
Figure 3: A simple O(1)-utility gap ncRIP protocol for NEXP.
O(α(n))-gap ncRIP protocol for PNEXP[α(n)]. Next, we give an ncRIP protocol with O(α(n))-
utility gap for the class PNEXP[α(n)], where α(n) is a function of n which (1) only takes positive
integral values, (2) is upper-bounded by a polynomial in n, and (3) is polynomial-time computable.10
Lemma 11. Any language L ∈ PNEXP[α(n)] has a 3-prover 5-round 6/(5α(n))-gap ncRIP protocol.
The ncRIP protocol for any L ∈ PNEXP[α(n)] is in Figure 4. It is fairly intuitive—V simulates the
polynomial-time Turing machine directly, and uses the ncRIP protocol for NEXP for the queries.
The analysis of the protocol illustrates the robustness of the solution concept. In particular, the
NEXP queries start non-trivial subforms in the game, and which of them are reachable under any
strategy profile s is determined solely by P ′1 strategy. Recall that the dominance condition must
hold at both reachable and unreachable subforms when arguing bottom up. Otherwise, P1 cannot
unilaterally deviate out of a bad strategy where he is lying on an NEXP gate to a strategy giving
the correct answers (and thus making a previously unreachable NEXP query reachable), if P2 and
P3 are giving wrong answers at those NEXP queries.
The utility-gap analysis of the protocol in Figure 4 shows that even though V can only check
the NEXP queries that P1 wants V to see, the protocol is designed to ensure that deviating provers
in some reachable subform suffer an O(1/α(n)) loss in their overall expected payment.
Simulating an MRIP protocol. We show how to simulate a general MRIP protocol (V, ~P )
with p(n) provers and k(n) rounds using a 2-prover 3-round ncRIP protocol (V ′, P ′1, P
′
2) with
exponential-utility gap. (The protocol (V ′, P ′1, P
′
2) is in Figure 5 in Section C.)
Essentially, V ′ gives all the randomness of V to P ′1 and asks for the entire transcript and uses P
′
2
to commit to a single prover’s message, and cross-checks their answers. However, we don’t want P ′1
9It is also possible to give a scoring-rule based ncRIP protocol for NEXP, similar to MRIP [20]. However, such a
protocol has an exponential utility gap and is subsumed by our simulation of MRIP in Figure 5.
10For Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, α(n) need only be a constant or polynomial in n. However, Lemma 11 holds for
all α(n)’s that are polynomial-time computable (given 1n) and polynomially bounded, such as log n,
√
n, etc.
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For any input x of length n, the protocol (V, ~P ) works as follows.
1. P1 sends (c, c1, . . . , cα(n)) ∈ {0, 1}
α(n)+1 to V . V outputs c at the end of the protocol.
2. V simulates M on x using the bits c1, . . . , cα(n) as answers to NEXP queries φ1, . . . , φα(n)
generated by M respectively. If M accepts and c = 0 or M rejects and c = 1, then the
protocol ends and R1 = −1, R2 = R3 = 0.
3. V picks a random index i′ from {1, . . . , α(n)} and sends (i′, φi′) to P2 and P3.
4. V runs the 2-prover 3-round O(1)-gap ncRIP protocol for NEXP (Figure 3) with P2 and P3
on φi. P2 and P3 get payments R2 and R3 based on the protocol. Let c
∗
i′ be the answer bit
in the NEXP protocol. If c∗i′ 6= ci′ , then R1 = 0; otherwise R1 = 1.
Figure 4: An O(α(n))-utility gap ncRIP protocol for PNEXP[α(n)].
who has access to all the randomness to dictate what information sets of P ′2 are reachable. Because
the ncRIP protocol only needs an exponential utility gap, V ′ asks one prover a totally random
question (independent of P ′1), and with exponentially small probability this random message is
exactly the message V ′ intended to check. This protocol shows why exponential gap guarantees
do not lead to meaningful protocols—a verifier that asks random questions can still extract honest
behavior from rational provers through the exponentially small changes in expected payments.
4 Upper Bounds: ncRIP Protocols with Utility Gap
In this section, we prove matching upper bounds on the classes of ncRIP protocols with con-
stant, polynomial and exponential utility gaps. We focus on the upper bound for O(1)-ncRIP and
poly(n)-ncRIP, in which a polynomial-time Turing machine needs to simulate the protocol with a
constant and polynomial number of queries to an NEXP oracle respectively.
To simulate an ncRIP protocol, we need to find a strategy profile “close enough” to the dominant
SSE so that the answer bit is still correct, that is, it is sufficient to find any strategy profile that
satisfies the utility gap guarantee. We formalize this restatement of Definition 9 below.
Observation 12. Given input x and an α(n)-utility gap ncRIP protocol (V, ~P ), let s be a strategy
profile such that for all subforms HI (reachable under s), and for all provers Pj acting in HI :
uj(x, r, (V, ~P ), (s−I , s
∗
I))− uj(x, r, (V, ~P ), (s−I , sI)) <
1
α(n)
,
where s∗ is a dominant SSE. Then, the answer bit c under s must be correct.
There are several challenges involved in finding a strategy profile satisfying Observation 12.
First, the size of the game tree of any ncRIP protocol—small gap notwithstanding—can be
exponential in n. Even if the polynomial-time machine considers a single strategy profile s at a
time, since V can flip polynomially many coins, the part of the tree “in play”—the number of
decision nodes reached with nonzero probability under s—can still be exponential in n.
The second and related challenge is that of verifying whether a strategy profile is a dominant
SSE. Note that while the NEXP oracle can guess and verify an SSE, it cannot directly help with
dominant SSEs. The polynomial-time machine must check using backward induction if an SSE is
dominant on all its reachable subforms (which can again be exponential in n).
Finally, the polynomial-time machine needs to search through the exponentially large strategy-
profile space in an efficient way to find one which leads to the correct answer.
9
We now prove a fundamental lemma about ncRIP protocols with utility gap that lets us cir-
cumvent the first two challenges mentioned above.
Pruning Nature moves in ncRIP protocols. In this section we give our main technical lemma
for the upper bound, which shows that we can limit ourselves to examining protocols with bounded
game trees without loss of generality.
The problem is that in full generality, a verifier’s coin flips in an ncRIP protocol represent
Nature moves in the resulting game. A Nature move that imposes nonzero probabilities over
exponentially many outcomes can cause the game tree under play to be exponential in size.
We prune the Nature moves of a verifier so that a polynomial-time Turing machine simulating
an α(n) utility gap protocol can traverse the game tree reachable under any given s.
Lemma 13 (Pruning Lemma). Let L ∈ α(n)-ncRIP and let (V, ~P ) be an ncRIP protocol for L
with α(n) utility gap and p(n) provers. Given an input x and a strategy s, the protocol (V, ~P ) can
be transformed in exponential time to a new protocol (V ′, ~P ), where
• the probability distributions imposed by the nature moves of V ′ on x have O(α(n)) support,
• if s is a dominant SSE of (V, ~P ), then s induces a dominant SSE in (V ′, ~P ),
• |uj(x, s, (V, ~P ))− uj(x, s, (V
′, ~P ))| < 1/(4α(n)) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)}, and
• if the answer bit under s is wrong, then there exists a subform HI in the game (V
′, ~P ) (reachable
under s) and a prover Pj acting at HI , such that Pj loses a 1/(2α(n)) amount in his expected
payment compared to a strategy profile where sI (induced by s on HI) is replaced by s
∗
I (the
dominant SSE on HI), keeping the strategy profile outside HI , s−I , fixed.
We prove Lemma 13 in several parts. First, we show how to transform any nature move of V
that imposes a nonzero probability distribution on exponentially many outcomes into a probability
distribution with O(α(n)) support, given an input x and a strategy s of the provers.
Let (V, ~P ) use p(n) provers and let the running time of V be nk for some constant k. There can
be at most 2n
k
different payments that V can generate for a particular prover given input x. Given
x and s, fix a prover index j ∈ {1, p(n)}. Let R1, R2, . . . , Rm be the payments generated by V on s
for Pj . Let V ’s randomness assign probability distribution µ = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) to R1, R2, . . . , Rm
respectively. Then, the expected payment of Pj under s is uj(x, s, (V, ~P )) =
∑m
i=1 piRi.
Recall that uj(x, s, (V, ~P )) ∈ [−1, 1] for all 1 ≤ j ≤ p(n). For each prover Pj , divide the interval
[−1, 1] into 4α(n) intervals, each of length 1/(2α(n)). In other words, prover Pj ’s ith interval is
[i/2α(n), (i + 1)/2α(n))11 , for each i ∈ {−2α(n), . . . , 2α(n) − 1}.
We round the possible payments for Pj to a representative of the interval they belong. Specifi-
cally, we map each payment Ri to rj as described in Equation 1. There are potentially exponentially
rj =


4ℓ+1
4α(n) if Ri ∈
[
ℓ
2α(n) ,
2ℓ+1
4α(n)
)
4ℓ+3
4α(n) if Ri ∈
[
2ℓ+1
4α(n) ,
ℓ+1
2α(n)
) (1) p′i =
{ ∑
k∈Tj
pk if i = f(S(i))
0 otherwise
(2)
many different payments Ri, and only polynomially many different payments rj , so several Ri must
map to the same rj . Let Tj = {i : Ri maps to rj}. Let T = ∪j{Tj}. Thus the total number of
distinct rj’s is 8α(n), |T | = O(α(n)). Let S : {1, . . . ,m} → T , such that S(i) = Tj iff i ∈ Tj .
For each Tj ∈ T , let f(Tj) denote a unique index in the set Tj. Without loss of generality, let
f(Tj) be the lowest index in Tj. We define a new probability distribution µ
′ = (p′1, . . . , p
′
h) over
11To include 1 as a possible payment, interval 2α(n)−1 should be closed on both sides; we ignore this for simplicity.
10
the payments R1, . . . , Rh respectively given by Equation 2. In particular, for every Tj ∈ T , assign
Rf(Tj) probability
∑
k∈Tj
pk and for every other index ℓ ∈ Tj , ℓ 6= f(Tj), assign Rℓ probability 0.
Define V ′ as a polynomial-time verifier that simulates all deterministic computation of V . For
a fixed input x, V ′ imposes a probability distribution µ′ with O(α(n)) support for any probability
distribution µ imposed by V . For other inputs, V ′ simulates V without any modification.
Note that given input x, a strategy profile s and the protocol (V, ~P ), transforming the distribu-
tion µ to µ′ takes time linear in the size of the game tree, and thus exponential in n. (This means
that an NEXP oracle, given x, can guess a particular s and perform the transformation.)
Next, we show that if the strategy profile s is a dominant SSE of (V, ~P ), then s restricted to
the pruned game tree of (V ′, ~P ) imposes a dominant SSE on (V ′, ~P ) as well.
Claim 14. Any dominant SSE s in the game tree of protocol (V, ~P ) induces a dominant SSE in
the game tree of protocol (V ′, ~P ).
Proof. By contradiction, suppose s is not an SSE of (V ′, ~P ). Then there exists an information set
I = {h1, . . . , hm}, such that, conditioned on reaching I, the prover acting at I can improve his
expected payment by deviating (given his belief u′I at I if I is reachable under s and for any belief
he may hold at I if I is unreachable under s).
We split into two cases: I is either reachable or unreachable under s.
By construction, if I is reachable under s in (V ′, ~P ), then I must also be reachable under s in
(V, ~P ). Let µ′I = (p
′
1, . . . , p
′
m), where p
′
i is the probability assigned to hi and the support of µ
′
I is
O(α(n)). Let R1, . . . , Rm be the payments that the player acting on I gets under s conditioned
on reaching h1, . . . , hm respectively. Similarly, let R
′
1, . . . , R
′
m be the payments conditioned on
reaching h1, . . . , hm respectively under the strategy to which the player at I deviates from s. Then,∑m
i=1 p
′
iR
′
i >
∑m
i=1 p
′
iRi. Let µI = (p1, . . . , pm) be the beliefs on I under s in (V,
~P ). We use the
relationship between the distributions µ′I and µI , to show that such a deviation in (V
′, ~P ) would
imply a deviation in (V, ~P ). In particular, mapping µ′I back to µI , using Equation 2 we get:
m∑
i=1
(
Ii=f(S(i)) ·
∑
k∈S(i)
pk
)
R′i >
m∑
i=1
(
Ii=f(S(i)) ·
∑
k∈S(i)
pk
)
Ri
m∑
i=1
(
Ii=f(S(i)) ·
∑
k∈S(i)
pk
)
· min
k∈S(i)
R′k >
m∑
i=1
(
Ii=f(S(i)) ·
∑
k∈S(i)
pk
)
· max
k∈S(i)
Rk (3)
m∑
i=1
(
Ii=f(S(i)) ·
∑
k∈S(i)
pkR
′
k
)
>
m∑
i=1
(
Ii=f(S(i)) ·
∑
k∈S(i)
pkRk
)
m∑
i=1
piR
′
i >
m∑
i=1
piRi (4)
Inequality 3 holds because R′f(S(i)) > Rf(S(i)), and so the two payments lie in different intervals in
the mapping (Equation 1). Thus the minimum payment in the interval of R′f(S(i)) will be greater
than the maximum payment in the interval of Rf(S(i)). Finally, Inequality 4 contradicts the fact
that s was an SSE in (V, ~P ), achieving a contradiction for the case of reachable information sets.
For unreachable information sets the argument is easy. If I is unreachable under s in (V ′, ~P ),
then I must be unreachable under s in (V, ~P ). If the action of prover acting at I is not his best
response in (V ′, ~P ) for some history h ∈ I then, it contradicts the fact that s is an SSE of (V, ~P ).
Now, suppose s is not a dominant SSE of (V ′, ~P ). Then there exists a subgame HI of height k
such that s is dominant on all subgames following HI of height < k but not weakly-dominant at HI
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(among SSE’s that are dominant at all subforms following HI). Let s
∗ be dominant on HI , then
the expected payment of at least one prover Pj is better under s
∗, while everyone else does just as
well (given the beliefs at I derived using Bayes’ rule if I is reachable under s or given any beliefs
if I is unreachable under s). Writing out the expression of expected payment of Pj conditioned
on reaching HI and “unfolding” the probability distribution back to the original game, we get a
contradiction that s could not have been a dominant SSE of the original game, as the same strategy
s∗ would give Pj a better expected payment at HI while doing as well for other provers. The proof
is similar to the above and we omit the details.
We now show that for a given s, the expected payments of the provers under (V, ~P ) and under
(V ′, ~P ) are not too far off. In particular, we prove the following claim.
Claim 15. For all j ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)}, |uj(x, s, (V, ~P ))− uj(x, s, (V
′, ~P ))| < 1/(4α(n)).
Proof. Given input x and strategy profile s, fix a prover Pj . Let V generate payments
R1, R2, . . . , Rm under s for Pj , and assign the probability distribution µ = (p1, p2, . . . , pm) on
R1, R2, . . . , Rm respectively. Using Equations (1) and (2) we compare Pj ’s expected payment:
|uj(s, x, (V, ~P ))− uj(s, x, (V
′, ~P ))| =
∣∣∣∣
m∑
i=1
piRi −
∑
Tj∈T
(∑
k∈Tj
pk
)
Rf(Tj)
∣∣∣∣
=
∑
Tj∈T
∑
k∈Tj
pk
(
|Rf(Tj ) −Ri|
)
<
∑
Tj∈T
∑
k∈Tj
pi
(
1
4α(n)
)
=
( m∑
i=1
pi
)
1
4α(n)
=
1
4α(n)
To complete the proof of Lemma 13, we show that (V ′, ~P ) preservers utility gap guarantees.
Claim 16. Given input x, if the answer bit under s is wrong, then there exists a subform HI
reachable under s in (V ′, ~P ) and Pj acting at HI , such that Pj ’s expected payment under s is
1
2α(n)
less than his expected payment under (s−I , s
∗
I), where s
∗
I is a dominant SSE on HI .
Proof. Consider a strategy profile s∗ that is a dominant SSE in the game tree of (V, ~P ). Since s
gives the wrong answer bit, from the α(n)-utility gap guarantee of (V, ~P ) and Definition 9, there
exists a subform HI reachable under s, such that a prover Pj acting in HI loses 1/α(n) in his
expected payment under s compared to the strategy profile (s−I , s
∗
I). That is,
uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V,
~P ))− uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V, ~P )) >
1
α(n)
. (5)
Using Claim 14, s∗ also induces a dominant SSE in the game tree of (V ′, ~P ). And since HI is
reachable under s in (V, ~P ), it is reachable under s in (V ′, ~P ) as well. We show that:
uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V
′, ~P ))− uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V
′, ~P )) >
1
2α(n)
. (6)
Using Claim 15, prover Pj ’s expected payments in the two protocols under s and s
∗ follow:
|uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V, ~P ))− uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V
′, ~P ))| <
1
4α(n)
(7)
|uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V, ~P ))− uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V
′, ~P ))| <
1
4α(n)
(8)
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There are four cases depending on the sign of the left hand side of Inequalities (7) and (8). We
show that Claim 16 holds for one of the cases and omit the details of the others, which are similar.
Suppose the left hand side of both inequalities is positive, that is, uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V,
~P )) >
uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V
′, ~P )), and uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V, ~P )) > uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V
′, ~P )). Then
uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V
′, ~P ))− uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V
′, ~P ))
>
(
uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V,
~P ))−
1
4α(n)
)
− uj(s
′, x, (V ′, ~P ))
>
(
uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V, ~P )) +
1
α(n)
)
−
1
4α(n)
− uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V
′, ~P )) >
3
4α(n)
.
Using Lemma 13, given an O(α(n))-gap ncRIP protocol (where α(n) is constant or polynomial),
a polynomial-time oracle Turing machine can use its NEXP oracle to guess a strategy profile s, prune
the verifier’s Nature moves, and report the resulting O(α(n))-support distribution bit-by-bit. Thus,
it can simulate the new distribution and find the decision nodes that are reachable under s.
Searching through the strategy-profile space efficiently. The next question then is: how
should the polynomial-time Turing machine navigate the potential strategy-profile space (in poly-
nomial time) to find the strategy profile that satisfies Observation 12, and thus gives the correct
answer bit? To do this, we invoke a recurring idea: divide each prover’s expected payment interval
[−1, 1], evenly into 8α(n) subintervals of length 1/(4α(n)), and consider subinterval profiles
(a tuple of subintervals, one for each prover) to cut down on the search space.
Claim 17. Given an input x and an ncRIP protocol (V, ~P ) with α(n)-utility gap, consider a subin-
terval profile (L1, . . . , Lp(n)), where each Li = [k/(4α), (k + 1)/(4α + 1)) denotes a subinterval of
prover Pi in [−1, 1], for some k ∈ {−2α(n), . . . , 2α(n) − 1}. If any SSE s that has an expected
payment profile u˜(x, s) such that ui(x, s) ∈ Li for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p(n), and s does not satisfy Observa-
tion 12, then the expected payment profile u˜∗(x, s) under a dominant SSE s∗ cannot lie in the same
subinterval profile, that is, there exists a prover index j such that uj(x, s
∗) /∈ Lj.
Proof. Since s does not satisfy Observation 12, there exists a reachable subform HI and prover Pj
acting on HI such that the following holds. Without loss of generality, let µj(s, x) ∈ Lk.
uj(x, (s−I , s
∗
I), (V, ~P ))− uj(x, (s−I , sI), (V, ~P )) >
1
α(n)
uj(x, s
∗, (V, ~P )) >
1
α(n)
+
k
4α(n)
=⇒ uj(x, s
∗, (V, ~P )) /∈ Lk
Using Claim 17, if the polynomial-time Turing machine is able to test any SSE s with u˜(x, s)
in a subinterval profile, for all subinterval profiles, it is guaranteed to find one that satisfies Ob-
servation 12. This is because a dominant SSE of an ncRIP protocol is guaranteed to exist and its
expected payment profile must belong to some subinterval profile.
However, as there are O(α(n)) subintervals for each of the p(n) provers, there are O(α(n)p(n))
total subinterval profiles and a polynomial-time machine cannot test SSEs for each of them.
To reduce the search space further, we show that it is sufficient to consider subintervals of
the total expected payment interval and test an SSE s for each of them. To test if an SSE s
satisfies Observation 12, we go bottom-up in the game tree reachable under s to find the dominant
SSE on each subforms (which always exists in an ncRIP protocol).
Recall that a SSE s weakly-dominant if for any player i and SSE s′, ui(s) ≥ ui(s
′). We can
such strategies by only querying for the total expected payment intervals using the next lemma.
13
Lemma 18. If a weakly-dominant SSE exists then a strategy profile s is a weakly-dominant SSE
if and only if s is an SSE and s maximizes the sum of utilities of all players among all SSEs.
Using Lemma 18, we can divide the total expected payment range [−1, 1] into α(n)/4-sized
subintervals, and query whether a strategy profile has a total expected payment in a given interval.12
We are now ready to prove the upper bounds on the power of our ncRIP classes.
Constant Utility Gap. Using Lemma 13 and Lemma 18, simulating a constant-gap protocol
using a PNEXP[O(1)] machine M is easy. In particular, there are at most O(1) subforms that are
reachable under any strategy profile s, and the total expected payment of the provers conditioned on
reaching these subforms will be in one of the O(1) subintervals. Thus, there are O(1) combinations
of total expected payments on all subforms (including the whole game). M queries its NEXP oracle
whether there exists an SSE that achieves that combination of total expected payments on those
subforms, for all combinations. Then, M finds the maximum among all of the combinations that
got a “yes.” Such a maximum is guaranteed to exist for an ncRIP protocol and finally M queries
the oracle for the answer bit of the corresponding SSE by giving the dominant profile of total
expected payments over the subgames.
Lemma 19. O(1)-ncRIP ⊆ PNEXP[O(1)].
The polynomial-time oracle Turing machine in Lemma 19 can issue all its queries non-adaptively
That is, α(n)-ncRIP ⊆ P
NEXP[O(1)]
|| . Furthermore in Section 3, we show that O(1)-ncRIP ⊆
PNEXP[O(1)]. Indeed, the two classes are equal: P
NEXP[O(1)]
|| = P
NEXP[O(1)].
Since O(1)-MRIP = P
NEXP[O(1)]
|| [19, 20], this shows that cooperative provers are as powerful as
non-cooperative provers under constant utility-gap guarantees, and we obtain Corollary 4.
Polynomial Utility Gap. To simulate a polynomial-utility gap ncRIP protocol (V, ~P ), using a
PNEXP machine M , we put to use all the structure we have established in this section. We note
that the simple strategy of querying all possible payment combinations as in Lemma 19 does not
work (there are O(α(n)α(n)) total combinations).
We present a high-level structure of the proof here; see Section C for the full proof.
For each of the O(α(n)) subintervals of the interval [−1, 1] that correspond to an SSE, M does
a recursive search to find an exact total expected payment u(x, s) that is generated by an SSE. In
particular, M queries the NEXP oracle: Does there exist an SSE with total expected payment in the
first half of the ith interval? then recurses on the first half if the answer is yes, else recurses on the
second half. Thus, in polynomial time and with polynomial queries, M can find an exact u(x, s)
for an SSE s in the subinterval using the power of its adaptive queries.
Next, M simulates the protocol (V, ~P ) with the help of the oracle, under the SSE s for a given
subinterval. The Lemma 13 is crucial for M to simulate the verifier’s moves, because V in general
can induce exponential-size distributions. M traverses the tree reachable under s “top-down” using
the oracle to learn the pruned distributions and provers’ moves. Finally, M goes “bottom-up” to
test whether s satisfies Observation 12 on all its reachable subgames.
Lemma 20. poly(n)-ncRIP ⊆ PNEXP.
Exponential Utility Gap. Finally, we prove a tight upper bound on the class of ncRIP protocols
with exponential utility gaps. The proof follows immediately from that of Lemma 20. In fact, it is
simpler as the exponential-time Turing machine is powerful enough to (a) simulate V ’s Nature moves
directly, and (b) test all possible payment profiles. Thus in this proof we do not need Lemma 13
or the notion of subintervals.
12We maintain a constant total budget for V ; the payments in our protocols can be scaled so that total is in [−1, 1].
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Lemma 21. ncRIP ⊆ EXPpoly−NEXP.
Since EXPpoly−NEXP ⊆ EXPpoly−NEXP|| = EXP
NP
|| , and EXP
NP
|| ⊆ MRIP [20], Lemma 21 shows that
exp(n)-ncRIP ⊆ exp(n)-MRIP and using Lemma 27, we get that in general the two classes coincide.
In other words, non-cooperative rational proofs are as powerful as cooperative multi-prover rational
proofs under exponential utility gap and we obtain Corollary 6.
5 Additional Related Work
Rational Proofs. Azar and Micali [1] introduce rational interactive proofs (RIP) and used
scoring rules to construct simple and efficient (single-prover) RIP protocols. In a follow-up work [2],
they extended this work to design super-efficient rational proofs that have sublinear verification
and computation compelexity. Guo et al. present rational arguments for a computationally
bounded prover and a sublinear verifier in [34], and construct rational arguments for all languages
in P [35]. More recently, Campanelli and Rosario [13] study sequentially composable rational
proofs and rational proofs for space bounded computations [14], while Zhang and Blanton [54]
design protocols to outsource matrix multiplications to a rational cloud.
Chen et al. [20] introduce multi-prover rational interactive proofs (MRIP) in which multiple
provers cooperate to maximize their total payment. They show that the class equals EXP||NP under
exponential utility gap, P||NEXP under polynomial utility gap. In the full version [19], they show
that MRIP under constant utility gap is equal to P||NEXP[O(1)].
Game-Theoretic Characterization of Complexity Classes. Game-theoretic characterization
of complexity classes has been largely studied in the form of refereed games [18,24,26–28,40,45].
Chandra and Stockmeyer [18] show that any language in PSPACE is refereeable by a game of
perfect information. Feige and Kilian [24] show that the class of imperfect information, perfect
recall refereed games is exactly EXP. Feigenbaum, Koller and Shor [28] show that if provers are
allowed to have imperfect recall (essentially acting as oracles), refereed games can simulate EXPNP.
Query Complexity and Related Complexity Classes. The query complexity of oracle Turing
machines has been widely studied in the literature [6,11,52]. In this paper, we give game-theoretic
characterizations of the classes PNEXP[O(1)]. PNEXP, and EXPpoly−NEXP.
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A Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information and ncRIP
We describe a rational proof protocol with non-cooperative provers as an extensive-form game,
where the game tree is naturally induced by the possible coin flips and messages of the verifiers,
as well as the possible messages of the provers. For details on extensive-form games, we refer the
readers to the textbook by Osborne and Rubinstein [44].
In a protocol (V, ~P ) with input x, the set of provers ~P = (P1, . . . , Pp(n)) are the players and the
verifier V ’s random coin flips are treated as the moves of Nature . The history h = (a1, a2, . . . , aK)
corresponding to a decision node is the sequence of actions taken by Nature and the players along
the path from the root to the decision node. The set of valid histories (including φ, the empty
history corresponding to the root) is denoted by H. A history h is terminal if it corresponds to
a leaf in the game tree, and non-terminal otherwise.
Let Z(h) denote the player whose turn it is to act following a non-terminal history h—note
that even though in an ncRIP protocol more than one prover may send a message to the verifier
in a round, without loss of generality we can increase the number of rounds such that only a single
prover acts in each round. Let A(h) denote the set of actions available to the acting player at a
non-terminal history h: that is, A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}. If Z(h) is Nature, then A(h) is the set
of possible coin flips and messages of the verifier following h; otherwise A(h) is the set of possible
messages that Z(h) may send to the verifier. For each terminal history h, the utility of a player i
following h, ui(h), is the payment Ri computed by the verifier given x and h.
Since the verifier’s coins are private and a prover does not see the messages exchanged between
the verifier and the other provers, an ncRIP protocol represents an extensive-form game of imperfect
information. An information set Ii of a player Pi is a subset of all possible histories h with
Z(h) = Pi, and represents all the information that the player knows when acting in one of the
decision nodes in Ii. That is, when a decision node in Ii is reached, Pi knows that Ii has been
reached but does not know exactly which node he is at. The set of actions available to player i at
every decision node in a particular information set is the same, i.e., A(h) = A(h′) for all h, h′ ∈ Ii.
Let A(Ii) denote the set of available actions at an information set Ii. The set of all information
sets of Pi forms a partition of the set {h ∈ H : Z(h) = Pi}, and let Ii to denote this partition,
referred to as the information partition of Pi. In terms of the protocol, Ii is in a one-to-one
correspondence with the set of possible message sequences (mi1, . . . ,mij) seen by Pi, where j ∈
{1, . . . , p(n)} and Pi is acting in round j.
A pure strategy si of a player Pi in an extensive-form game is a function that assigns an
action in A(Ii) to each information set Ii ∈ Ii. A behavioral strategy βi of Pi is a collection
(βi(Ii))Ii∈Ii of independent probability measures, where βi(Ii) is a probability measure over the
action set A(Ii). A behavioral strategy βi is completely mixed if each βi(Ii) assigns a positive
probability to every action in A(Ii). In ncRIP protocols, since the provers are deterministic, we
only consider pure strategies of the players. However, the solution concept introduced in this paper
applies to behavioral strategies as well. A player i’s utility under a strategy profile s, ui(s), is his
expected utility over the distribution of histories induced by s and the verifier’s randomness.
The provers are computationally unbounded and never “forget” anything and thus the corre-
sponding extensive-form game has perfect recall . That is, for any two histories h and h′ in the
same information set Ii of a player Pi, h and h
′ pass the same sequence of information sets to player
Pi. Furthermore, for any information set in this sequence, player Pi took the same action in h and
h′. This holds in any ncRIP protocol since all histories of prover Pi in the same information set Ii
at round j correspond to the sequence of messages (mi1, . . . ,mij) seen by Pi up to round j.
B Properties of Strong Sequential Equilibrium
In this section, we prove several important properties of strong sequential equilibrium, which make
it a good candidate solution concept in designing extensive-form mechanisms.
Strong Sequential Equilibrium Admits a Sequential Equilibrium. We first show that, given
a strategy profile s that is a strong sequential equilibrium (thus does not rely on a belief system),
we can construct a belief system µ such that the pair (s, µ) forms a sequential equilibrium.
Lemma 22. For any strategy profile s that is a strong sequential equilibrium, there exists a belief
system µ such that (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Proof. The sequential-rationality requirement will follow easily from the definition of SSE. To prove
that s admits a sequential equilibrium, the key is to pair it with a consistent belief system; see Sec-
tion 2 for definition. Indeed, we construct a belief system µ and show that, there exists a sequence
of pairs (sε, µε)ε→0 which converges to (s, µ), as ε goes to 0, where each s
ε is a profile of completely
mixed behavioral strategies and each uε is the belief system derived from sε using Bayes’ rule.
Recall that a strategy profile s defines a probability distribution over the actions available to
a player at an information set where he acts. That is, for each information set Ii of a player i,
si(Ii) is a probability distribution over A(Ii), the set of actions available to player i at Ii. In
particular, if A(Ii) = (a1, . . . , ak), then si(Ii) = (pi(a1), . . . , pi(ak)) where pi(aℓ) is the probability
that player i chooses action aℓ at Ii. Let A
+(Ii) and A
0(Ii) be the set of actions at information
set Ii which player i chooses with positive probability and zero probability respectively; that is,
A+(Ii) = {aℓ ∈ A(Ii) | pi(aℓ) > 0} and A
0(Ii) = A(Ii) \A
+(Ii). For any ε ∈ (0, 1), we define s
ε
i for
player i at information set Ii as follows: if A
0(Ii) = ∅ then s
ε
i (Ii) = si(Ii); otherwise,
sεi (Ii)(aℓ) =
{
(1− ε) · pi(aℓ) for each aℓ ∈ A
+(Ii);
ε
|A0(Ii)|
for each aℓ ∈ A
0(Ii).
By construction, sεi (Ii) is a valid probability distribution over Ii and is completely mixed, that is, as-
signs a positive probability to every action in Ii. Indeed, because
∑k
ℓ=1 pi(aℓ) =
∑
aℓ∈A+(Ii)
pi(aℓ) =
1, when A0(Ii) 6= ∅ we have
∑
aℓ∈A(Ii)
sεi (Ii)(aℓ) =
∑
aℓ∈A+(Ii)
(1− ε)pi(aℓ)+ ε = 1. It is easy to see
that sεi converges to si when ε→ 0.
Given the strategy profile sε, to define µεi , the belief system of a player i, consider an arbitrary
information set Ii where player i acts. The probability that a particular history h = (a
1, . . . , aK) ∈
Ii occurs can be derived from s
ε as follows. For any history h′ = (a1, . . . , aw) with 0 ≤ w ≤ K − 1,
recall that Z(h′) is the player acting following history h′. For any action a ∈ A(h′), let sεZ(h′)(h
′)(a)
denote the probability assigned by sεZ(h′) to action a at history h
′ (i.e., at the information set
containing h′). We have
Pr {h occurs under sε} =
K−1∏
w=0
sεZ(a1,...,aw)(a
1, . . . , aw)(aw+1) = chε
eh(1− ε)fh ,
where ch, eh and fh are positive constants depending on s and h, but not on ε. In particular,
letting S0 be the set of actions aw+1 in h that are assigned zero probability by sZ(h′) at history
h′ = (a1, . . . , aw), we have eh = |S
0|. fh is the number of actions a
w+1 in h such that aw+1 is not
in S0 but sZ(h′) is not completely mixed at h
′ either. Finally,
ch =
∏
0≤w≤K−1
aw+1 /∈S0
sZ(a1,...,aw)(a
1, . . . , aw)(aw+1) ·
∏
0≤w≤K−1
aw+1∈S0
1
|A0(a1, . . . , aw)|
,
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where the second term is defined to be 1 if S0 = ∅. Note that Pr {h occurs under sε} > 0 for every
h ∈ Ii.
The probability that the information set Ii is reached under s
ε is P(Ii) ,∑
h∈Ii
Pr {h occurs under sε} =
∑
h∈Ii
chε
eh(1− ε)fh > 0. Then P(Ii) can be written as a polyno-
mial in ε, that is, P(Ii) = b0+ b1ε+ b2ε
2 + . . .+ brε
r, where the coefficients b0, . . . , br may be zero,
positive or negative. Following Bayes’ rule, for any history h ∈ Ii,
µεi (Ii)(h) =
chε
eh(1− ε)fh
P(Ii)
=
chε
eh(1− ε)fh
b0 + b1ε+ b2ε2 + . . .+ brεr
> 0.
To define the belief system µ, let d be the minimum degree of ε in P(Ii) such that bd 6= 0.
As the minimum degree of ε in each term chε
eh(1 − ε)fh is eh with coefficient ch > 0, we have
d = minh∈Ii eh and bd =
∑
h∈Ii,eh=d
ch > 0. For any h ∈ Ii, we define µi(Ii)(h) = ch/bd(> 0) if
eh = d, and µi(Ii)(h) = 0 if eh > d. It is easy to see that µi(Ii) is a probability distribution over
Ii. Moreover, limε→0 µ
ε
i (Ii)(h) = ch/bd when eh = d, and limε→0 µ
ε
i (Ii)(h) = 0 when eh > d. Thus,
limε→0 µ
ε
i (Ii)(h) = µi(Ii)(h) for any player i, information set Ii of i and history h ∈ Ii, and µ
ε
converges to µ as ε→ 0. Since sε converges to s as we have seen, s and µ are consistent.
For sequential rationality, the only thing we need to show is that, at a reachable information
set, the belief specified by µ is derived from s using Bayes’ rule. To do so, consider an arbitrary
player i and an information set Ii of i that is reachable by s. By definition, there exists h ∈ Ii such
that eh = 0, thus d = 0 for P(Ii) and b0 =
∑
h∈Ii,eh=0
ch. Therefore µi(Ii) is indeed the probability
distribution derived from s using Bayes’ rule. Sequential rationality of s (with respect to µ) then
follows from the definition of SSE. Thus (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium.
Alternative Definition of Strong Sequential Equilibrium. The notion of strong sequential
equilibrium requires that at any unreachable information set, regardless of the belief the acting
player holds at that set, his action should be a best response to that belief and the other players’
strategies. We now give an equivalent definition of SSE, which says that a player’s strategy at an
unreachable information set should be optimal following every history in that information set. This
definition is more convenient when proving that a strategy profile is an SSE.
Definition 23. A strategy profile s is a strong sequential equilibrium if for every player i and
information set Ii of i, we have:
• At reachable information sets I: conditional on Ii being reached, player i’s strategy si is a
best response to s−i, given i’s beliefs at Ii being derived from s using Bayes’ rule.
• At unreachable information sets Ii: for every history h ∈ Ii, conditional on Ii being reached,
player i’s strategy si is a best response to s−i, given i’s belief that he is at h with probability 1.
We now prove the equivalence of the two definitions of SSE in the following lemma. W.l.o.g., s
is a profile of pure strategies.
Lemma 24. For any strategy profile s, any player i and information set Ii of i that is not reached
with positive probability under s, conditional on Ii being reached, si is a best response to s−i with
respect to all possible beliefs that player i may hold at Ii if and only if for every history h ∈ Ii, si
is a best response to s−i given i’s belief that he is at h with probability 1.
Proof. The “only if” part is immediate, because for any history h ∈ Ii, “at h with probability 1
(and any other history with probability 0)” is a specific belief that i may hold at Ii.
The “if” part is also easy to show. Suppose that si is a best response to s−i conditional on every
history h ∈ Ii (i.e., at h with probability 1). To show that si is a best response to s−i conditional
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on all possible beliefs player i may hold at information set Ii, arbitrarily fix a belief µi(Ii) over Ii
and a strategy s′i. Let Ii = {h1, h2, . . . , hm} and µi(Ii) = (µi(Ii)(h1), µi(Ii)(h2), . . . , µi(Ii)(hm)),
where µi(Ii)(hk) is the probability with which player i believes that history hk occurs conditional
on Ii being reached. Then, player i’s expected utilities under si and s
′
i respectively, conditioned on
Ii, µi(Ii) and s−i, are
ui(si, s−i|µi(Ii)) =
m∑
k=1
µi(Ii)(hk)·ui(si, s−i|hk) and ui(s
′
i, s−i|µi(Ii)) =
m∑
k=1
µi(Ii)(hk)·ui(s
′
i, s−i|hk),
where ui(si, s−i|hk) is player i’s utility under (si, s−i), conditioned on history hk being reached at
Ii. Since si is a best response to s−i at every hk ∈ Ii, we have ui(si, s−i|hk) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i|hk) ∀k ∈
{1, . . . ,m}. Thus ui(si, s−i|µi(Ii)) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i|µi(Ii)) and the “if” part holds.
One-Shot Deviation for Strong Sequential Equilibrium. Informally, the one-shot deviation
principle says that a player cannot change his action at a single information set (without changing
the rest of his strategy) and improve his expected reward.
In the context of sequential equilibrium, it is well known that given a consistent belief system
µ, (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium if and only if the one-shot deviation principle holds, that is,
no player i has an information set Ii at which a change in si(Ii)—holding the remainding of si
fixed—increases his expected utility conditional on reaching Ii [37, 44].
Since strong sequential equilibrium does not require artificial notion of beliefs for unreachable
information sets, we define a stronger notion of one-shot deviation at those information sets— for
every decision node (i.e., history) in an unreachable information set of player i, there does not exist
a one-shot deviation at that node which improves player i’s utility conditional on that node being
reached. Note that at reachable information sets, both the definition and proof of the one-shot
deviation condition for SSE are exactly the same as in SE [37].
Lemma 25 (One-Shot Deviation for Strong Sequential Equilibrium). For any strategy profile s, s
is a strong sequential equilibrium if and only if it satisfies the following one-shot deviation principle:
For every player i and every information set Ii of i,
• If Ii is reachable under s: there does not exist a change in si(Ii) (holding the rest of si fixed)
that increases player i’s expected utility conditional on reaching Ii, given his belief at Ii derived
using Bayes’ rule.
• If Ii is unreachable under s: for every history h ∈ Ii, there does not exist a change in si(Ii)
(holding the rest of si fixed) that increases player i’s expected utility conditional on reaching h.
Proof. The “only if” part follows immediately from Definition 23 and the fact that a one-shot
deviation results in a different strategy for the deviating player. We now prove the “if” part, that
is, if s satisfies the one-shot deviation principle then it is a strong sequential equilibrium.
Reachable information sets. First of all, similar to the proof of Lemma 22, we can construct
a belief system µ such that s and µ are consistent. Indeed, the construction of µ only depends on the
actions taken by s and does not depend on the utilities induced by s at all. Since s satisfies the one-
shot deviation principle at every reachable information set and at every history in each unreachable
information set, it is not hard to see that s satisfies the one-shot deviation principle with respect
to µ. Thus (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium. Accordingly, for any player i and information set Ii
of i that is reachable by s, si is a best response to s−i conditional on µi(Ii) (which is derived from
s using Bayes’ rule at Ii), as desired by the definition of SSE.
Unreachable information sets. Next, we use backward induction to show that, for any player
i, information set Ii of i that is unreachable by s, and history h ∈ Ii, si is a best response to s−i
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conditional on reaching h. To begin with, if h is of height 1 then this immediately holds: indeed, the
strategy induced by si following h is exactly the action si(Ii), thus the one-shot deviation principle
implies that si is a best response to s−i at h.
Now, arbitrarily fix a player i, information set Ii of i unreachable by s, and a history h ∈ Ii of
height larger than 1. By induction, assume that for any information set I ′i of i unreachable by s,
and history h′ ∈ I ′i of height smaller than that of h, si is a best response to s−i at h
′. For the sake
of contradiction, suppose player i can deviate to strategy s′i and increase his utility conditional on
reaching h, that is,
ui(s
′
i, s−i|h) > ui(si, s−i|h).
If s′i(Ii) = si(Ii), consider the first history h
′ following h where player i acts and s′i differs from
si. As h is unreachable by s, h
′ is unreachable by s as well. However, the height of h′ is smaller
than that of h and ui(s
′
i, s−i|h
′) = ui(s
′
i, s−i|h) > ui(si, s−i|h) = ui(si, s−i|h
′), contradicting the
inductive hypothesis. Thus we have
s′i(Ii) 6= si(Ii).
If s′i is the same as si at all the histories following (h, s
′
i(Ii)) where player i acts, then the one-
shot deviation principle is violated. Accordingly, there must exist a history following (h, s′i(Ii)),
where player i acts and s′i differ from si. Letting h
′ be the first such history, we have that the
height of h′ is smaller than that of h. Since h′ is unreachable by s, by the inductive hypothesis we
have that si is a best response to s−i at h
′. Thus ui(si, s−i|h
′) ≥ ui(s
′
i, s−i|h
′). As ui(s
′
i, s−i|h
′) =
ui(s
′
i, s−i|h) > ui(si, s−i|h), we have
ui(si, s−i|h
′) > ui(si, s−i|h).
Let strategy s′′i be such that, it follows si till history h, then follows action s
′
i(Ii), then follows
s′i (and si as well, because they are the same after (h, s
′
i(Ii)) and before h
′) till history h′, and then
follows si for the rest. Note that s
′′
i can be obtained from si by a one-shot deviation from si(Ii) to
s′i(Ii). However,
ui(s
′′
i , s−i|h) = ui(s
′′
i , s−i|h
′) = ui(si, s−i|h
′) > ui(si, s−i|h),
contradicting the one-shot deviation principle. Therefore si is a best response to s−i conditional
on reaching h, as desired.
Combining everything together, by Definition 23, s is an SSE and Lemma 25 holds.
Verifying Strong Sequential Equilibrium. Given an extensive-form game with arbitrary num-
ber of players, it is possible to decide whether a pair (s, µ) is a sequential equilibrium in time
polynomial in the size of the game tree [30].
However, if only a strategy profile s is given, then it is NP-hard to decide whether s is part of
an SE (that is, whether there exists a belief system µ such that (s, µ) is an SE) [36]. As strong
sequential equilibrium does not rely on belief systems, we prove the following.
Lemma 26. Given an extensive-form game and a strategy profile s of the players, deciding whether
s is a SSE of the game can be done in time polynomial in the size of the game tree.
Proof. First of all, we can traverse the game tree in polynomial time, mark each information set
whether it is reachable by s or not, and compute, for each player i and each reachable information
set Ii of i, the belief µi(Ii) derived from s using Bayes’ rule. Next, we apply the one-shot deviation
principle following Lemma 25.
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To do so, we start from the bottom level of the tree and proceed up. For every player i and
every information set Ii of i, if Ii is unreachable under s, then we go through each h ∈ Ii and each
a ∈ A(Ii), and check if changing si(Ii) to a improves i’s utility conditional on reaching h. If so
then s is not an SSE. If Ii is reachable under s, then we go through every a ∈ A(Ii), and check if
changing si(Ii) to a improves i’s expected utility conditional on Ii and µi(Ii). If so then again s is
not an SSE. If all the checks above pass, then s is an SSE.
Since this procedure goes through each decision node of the game tree at most once, and since it
takes polynomial time to compute player i’s (expected) utility under s following a decision node (or
an information set), deciding whether s is an SSE takes polynomial time in the size of the tree.
C Omitted Proofs
In this section, we give full proofs of the lemma statements in Section 3 and Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 10. The ncRIP protocol for any language L ∈ NEXP is given in Figure 3.
We show that there exists a strategy profile s = (s1, s2) of provers P1 and P2 respectively that is
a dominant SSE of the game tree corresponding to the protocol (V, P1, P2) and under any dominant
SSE, the answer bit c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
In the protocol, if c = 0, no player acts. If c = 1, the verifier executes the 1-round blackbox
MIP protocol with P1 and P2. To exhibit a strategy that is a best response for P1 and P2 on
their information sets at step 3, we look at the messages the verifier sends to each prover in
the classic MIP protocol. In the MIP protocol, the verifier sends P1 a tuple of message pairs
~m1 = ((q1, x1), . . . , (qm, xm)) where m is a polynomial in n and V sends P2 a tuple of random
messages ~m2 = (y1, . . . , ym). P1 sends back a polynomial P (t) and P2 sends back the value of the
polynomial P (t) for t satisfying qj + txj = yj. The verifier rejects if their answers are inconsistent.
To analyze the SSE strategy, without loss of generality, suppose P1 moves last in the MIP
protocol. Any information set I1 of P1 at step 3 is characterized by the message ~m1 he receives.
The decision nodes in I1 correspond to each possible message ~m2 that P2 could have received.
Because the V gives the largest payment when the MIP protocol accepts, given P2’s strategy,
if any information set I1 of P1 is reached under s then P1’s best response at I1 is to maximize the
acceptance-probability of the MIP protocol given his beliefs on I1. Similarly, given P2’s strategy, if
any information set I1 of P1 is unreachable under s then, P1’s best response at I1 for every decision
node in I1 is the following: given ~m1 = ((q1, x1), . . . , (qm, xm)), respond with a polynomial P (t)
such that P (t)’s value at all t coincides with P2’s reply on all yj where qj + txj = yj.
Given P1’s strategy of committing to a polynomial P (t) that matches P2 on all values of t,
P2’ best response at any information set I2 (reachable or unreachable under s) at step 3 at every
decision node in I2 is to answer the tuple of queries (y1, . . . , ym) so as to maximize the acceptance
probability of the MIP protocol. The verifier’s move at step 3 is the root of a non-trivial subform.
Conditioned on step 3 being reached, any dominant SSE at this subform corresponds to a strategy
profile s that is an SSE, which when restricted to this subform, maximizes the acceptance probaility
of the MIP protocol. Under any such dominant SSE, we show that P1’s best response at step 1 is
to send the correct answer bit.
Suppose x ∈ L. If P1 sends c = 0, then R1 = 1/2 with probability 1. On the other hand, if
P1 sends c = 1, by the soundness condition of the MIP protocol, the acceptance probability is 1,
leading to R1 = 1. Thus for x ∈ L, s is a dominant SSE iff P1 sends c = 1.
Suppose x /∈ L. If P1 reports c = 0, then R1 = 1/2 with probability 1. On the other hand if
P1 reports c = 1, then by the soundness condition of the MIP protocol, the maximum acceptance
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probability is 1/3 leading to R1 = 1. The protocol rejects with probability at least 2/3 leading to
R1 = −1. Thus, P1’s expected payment for misreporting the answer bit is at most R1 = −1/3.
Thus for x /∈ L, s is a dominant SSE iff P1 sends c = 0.
Thus, under s which is a dominant SSE, c = 1 if and only if x ∈ L.
Furthermore, the payment incurred by the provers when the answer bit sent in the first round
is incorrect is at least 5/6 for both provers and thus the protocol has constant utility gap.
Proof of Lemma 11. Consider any language L ∈ PNEXP[α(n)]. Let M be a polynomial-time Turing
machine deciding L, with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language.
The ncRIP protocol for L is given in Figure 4.
Let s1, s2, s3 denote the strategy used by P1, P2 and P3 for the protocol in Figure 4, and
s = (s1, s2, s3). First, note that regardless of s2 and s3, P1’s best response at step 1 is to send the
bits c, c1, . . . , cα(n) such that the verification in step 2 goes through. In particular, if s1 is such
that the output of M on input x, using c1, . . . , cα(n) as answers to NEXP queries φ1, . . . , φα(n) is
consistent with c, then P1 gets R1 ≥ 0. Meanwhile, if the verification in step 2 fails then R = −1.
Thus, under any SSE s, the answer bits c1, . . . , cα(n) sent by P1 must be consistent with the
computation of M on x and the final the answer bit c, regardless of s2 and s3.
We now argue using backward induction. Each random index i′ chosen by V in step 3 together
with φi′ starts a subform. In particular, since P2 and P3 both know (i
′, φi′), all their information
sets starting from step 4 are completely disjoint from information sets reached under a different
index and NEXP query. By Lemma 10, there exists a dominant SSE s on each such subform
simulating an NEXP query, and under any dominant SSE, s2 and s3 are such that c
∗
i′ is the correct
answer to the NEXP query.
Moving up the tree, the next subform is induced by V ’s nature move at step 3 assigning a
probability to each subsequent subform. Since under any dominant SSE, the expected payments of
P2 and P3 (conditioned on reaching these subforms) are maximized, the overall expected payments
under V ’s nature move at step 3 is also maximized.
We move up a further level in the tree to the root. We show that P1’s best response at step 1
is to send the correct answer bits, given that under any dominant SSE s:
• P2 and P3 answer each NEXP query φi′ determined by s1 and index i
′ correctly, and
• the verification in step 2 goes through (i.e. P does not set R1 = −1) under s1.
Suppose s1 is such that there exists an NEXP query where P1 lies. Let k be the first NEXP query
index such that ck is not the correct answer to query φk, where 1 ≤ k ≤ α(n). In particular, the
instance φk is evaluated correctly (by runningM on x using the correct answers to previous queries,
c1, . . . , ck−1) but the answer ck is not evaluated correctly based on φk. Then with probability 1/α(n),
V picks k in step 3 and crosschecks the ck with c
∗
i′ , in which case the verification fails and R1 = 0.
Thus, P1’s expected payment is at most 1−1/α(n). If P1 answers all NEXP queries correctly, since
the verification in step 2 goes through, P1 gets R1 = 1 with probability 1. Thus, c, c1, . . . , cα(n) are
correct under any dominant SSE s, and c = 0 if and only if x ∈ L.
Now, we show that protocol (V, ~P ) has O(α(n)) utility gap. Let s∗ be a dominant SSE of the
game resulting from (V, ~P ). Suppose s′ is such that the answer bit c′ under s′ is incorrect. We
go “bottom-up” in the game tree and exhibit a subform HI (reachable under s
′) such that some
prover acting in that subform loses O(1/α(n)) compared to the strategy where s∗I is played on HI ,
keeping the rest of the strategy fixed.
First, consider all the NEXP queries at step 4 that start subforms. Suppose there exists a query
φk committed under s
′
1, for 1 ≤ k ≤ α(n), such that ck∗ is the wrong answer to φk. By Lemma 10,
both P2 and P3 lose a constant amount (5/6 in particular) from their expected payment (conditioned
on reaching this subform) compared to the dominant SSE strategy profile s∗φk which reports the
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correct answer to φk. Since V chooses φk with probability 1/α(n), P2 and P3 can gain O(1/α(n)) in
their overall expected payment by deviating to strategy profile sφk , at the subform corresponding
to (k, φk) keeping s
′
−φk
fixed. Specifically,
µi
(
x, r, (s′−φk , s
∗
φk
), (V, ~P )
)
− µi
(
x, r, (s′−φk , s
′
φk
), (V, ~P )
)
>
1
α(n)
(
5
6
)
, for i ∈ {2, 3}.
Finally, suppose P2 and P3 answer all NEXP queries (reachable under s
′) correctly. Then, P1
loses at least 1/α(n) at the subform at the root—the entire game. Since the answer bit c′ under s′
is incorrect, either step 2 fails or P1 lies on some NEXP query. In the first case, P1 gets −1 with
probability 1 compared to an expected payment of 1 under s∗. In the second case, P1 gets caught
in step 4 with probability 1/α(n), and gets an expected payment of at most 1 − 1/α(n), losing at
least 1/α(n) compared to s∗.
Thus, the protocol (V, ~P ) is an ncRIP protocol for PNEXP[O(α(n)]) and has O(α(n)) utility gap.
Proof of Lemma 27. Let (V, ~P ) be an MRIP protocol with p(n) provers and k(n) rounds for a
language L. Without loss of generality, each message in the protocol is of length ℓ(n) for any input
of length n, where ℓ(n) is a polynomial in n. We shift and rescale the payment function of V , so
that the payment is always in [0, 1], and the expected payment is strictly greater than 0 under the
provers’ best strategy profile.
We simulate (V, ~P ′) using an ncRIP protocol (V ′, (P ′1, P
′
2)), given in Figure 5.
Lemma 27. Any MRIP protocol can be simulated using a 2-prover 3-round ncRIP protocol with
O(1/2n
k
)-utility gap, for some constant k, where n is the length of the input.
Given an input x of length n, and an MRIP protocol (V, ~P ), the ncRIP protocol (V ′, ~P ′) is:
1. P ′1 sends the round 1 messages m11, . . . ,mp(n)1 of (V,
~P ) to V ′. V ′ outputs c, the first bit of
m11, at the end of the protocol.
2. V ′ selects a random prover index i ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)} and a random round j ∈ {1, . . . , k(n)}.
Then, V ′ generates a random string m˜ij of length (j − 1)ℓ(n).
3. V ′ sends (i, j, m˜ij) to P
′
2. P
′
2 simulates Pi on round j, and sends the message m
′
ij to V
′.
4. V ′ generates all the randomness r used by V and sends it to P ′1.
5. P ′1 uses r to simulate the protocol (V,
~P ), and sends the resulting transcript ~m to V ′.
6. If m˜ij 6= (mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)), where mij denotes prover Pi’s message in round j according
to ~m sent by P1’, then the protocol ends and R
′
1 = R
′
2 = 0.
7. Otherwise, if mij 6= m
′
ij, then R
′
1 = R
′
2 = −1.
8. Else, V ′ computes the payment R in (V, ~P ) using x, r and ~m, and sets R′1 = 0, R
′
2 = R.
Figure 5: Simulating any MRIP using an ncRIP protocol with exponential utility gap.
Let s′1 and s
′
2 denote the strategy of the provers P
′
1 and P
′
2 respectively and s
′ = (s′1, s
′
2). Since
P ′2 is queried only once and about a single message in Step 3, any strategy s
′
2 of P
′
2 de facto commits
to a strategy profile for the provers in (V, ~P ).
We analyze the game tree of the protocol (V ′, ~P ′) bottom-up.
The last move is by P ′1 sending the entire transcript ~m at step 5. Any information set I
′
1 of P
′
1
is characterized by the randomness r received by P ′1 in step 4 and all information sets are reachable
under any s′. The decision nodes in I ′2 correspond to different strings m˜ij that P
′
2 could have been
26
asked in step 2. Given s′2, the best response of P
′
1 at any information set I
′
1, for any beliefs at I
′
1, is
to match the transcript committed by P ′2 and make the verification in step 7 go through. Suppose
there exists a prover index i and round j such that the message mij in ~m that is inconsistent
with the corresponding message m′ij committed under s
′
2. With probability
1
2(j−1)ℓ(n)
, the random
string m˜ij generated by V
′ in Step 2 is equal to (mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)), otherwise the protocol ends
with R′1 = 0. With probability at least
1
p(n)k(n) , V
′ chooses (i, j) in step 2, and queries P ′2 for m
′
ij
and R′1 = −1. If (i, j) is not chosen then R
′
1 = 0. Thus, P
′
1 expected payment at I
′
1 is at most∑
i≤p(n),1≤j≤k(n)
1
2(j−1)ℓ(n)
·
1
p(n)k(n)
·
(
Imij 6=m′ij
· (−1) + Imij=m′ij · 0
)
< 0.
On the other hand, matching s′2 on all messages leads to an expected payment of 0 at I
′
1 for P
′
1.
Given that P ′1 best response is to make the verifier in step 7 go through for every randomness r,
we analyze P ′2 move at step 3. Any information set I
′
2 of P
′
2 is characterized by the random string
m˜ij received by P
′
2 in step 2 and all information sets are reachable under any s
′. The decision
nodes in I ′1 correspond to different random strings r that P
′
1 could have been asked in step 2. The
best response of P ′2 at any information set I
′
1, for any beliefs at I
′
1, is to commit to the correct
strategy profile s of the provers ~P . Suppose P ′2 commits to a strategy profile s
′ such that the
answer bit under s′ is wrong. With probability 1
2(j−1)ℓ(n)
, the random string m˜ij generated by V
′
in Step 2 matches (mi1, . . . ,mi(j−1)), otherwise the protocol ends with R
′
2 = 0. If it matches, then
P ′2 expected payment is determined by the expected payment that s˜ gets in (V,
~P ) given x and
randomness r, which is strictly less than the expected payment under the strategy profile s which
commits to the correct answer bit (by correctness of the original MRIP protocol). That is,
∑
1≤j≤k(n)
1
k(n)
·
1
2(j−1)ℓ(n)
· u
(V, ~P )
(x, s˜) <
∑
1≤j≤k(n)
1
k(n)
·
1
2(j−1)ℓ(n)
· u
(V, ~P )
(x, s).
Thus, given that s′1 matches s
′
2 for every randomness r, the best response by P
′
2 is to commit to a
strategy profile s′2 = s that maximizes the total expected payment of the original protocol (V,
~P )
and thus has the correct answer bit.
There are no non-trivial subform in the game. Any weakly-dominant SSE is a dominant SSE,
under which both P ′1 and P
′
2 maximize their expected payments—P
′
1 matches P
′
2 on all messages
and P ′2 commits to the correct strategy profile s. Thus, the protocol (V,
~P ) is correct.
Proof of Lemma 19. Given any L ∈ α(n)-ncRIP, let (V, ~P ) be the MRIP protocol with α(n) utility
gap for L, where α(n) is a constant.
Given an input x of lenth n, consider the following deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing
machine M with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language. Similar to the proof of Lemma 20,
M divides [−1, 1] into 8α(n) intervals, each of length 1/4α(n). In other words, the ith interval is
[i/4α(n), (i + 1)/4α(n)) for each i ∈ {−4α(n), . . . , 4α(n) − 1}.13
Using Lemma 13, under a given input x and strategy profile s, there are at most 8α(n) subforms
are reached under any s in the modified game. Total expected payment of provers acting within
any subform (conditioned on reaching the subform) must lie in any one of the 8α(n) intervals
in [−1, 1]. Thus overall, there are O(α(n)α(n)) combinations of total expected payments over
subforms, which is still O(1). Let (u, uI1 , . . . , uIk) be a tuple of total expected payments, where
k = 8α(n), the maximum number of subforms reachable under any s, and u represents the total
13To include 1 as a possible reward, interval 4α(n)− 1 should be closed on both sides; we ignore this for simplicity.
27
expected payment of the whole game, whereas uIj represents total expected payment of the provers
acting in subform Ij (conditioned on reaching Ij).
For each combination (u, uI1 , . . . , uIk), M queries O: does there exists a strategy profile that
is an SSE and the total expected payments over reachable subforms under s and O(α(n)) support
Nature moves imposed by Lemma 13 is (u, uI1 , . . . , uIk) (conditioned on reaching the subforms)?
Among the queries to which the oracle’s answer is “yes”, M finds the combination that achieves
maximum total expected payment for all subforms. Such a combination is guaranteed to exist
because (V, ~P ) is an ncRIP protocol, and a dominant SSE of the game exists.
Proof of Lemma 20. Given any L ∈ poly(n)-ncRIP, let (V, ~P ) be the ncRIP protocol with α(n)
utility gap for L, where α(n) = nk for some constant k.
Given an input x of lenth n, consider the following deterministic polynomial-time oracle Turing
machine M with access to an oracle O for an NEXP language. M divides [−1, 1] into 8α(n)
intervals, each of length 1/4α(n). In other words, the ith interval is [i/4α(n), (i + 1)/4α(n)) for
each i ∈ {−4α(n), . . . , 4α(n) − 1}.14
For each interval [i/4α(n), (i+1)/4α(n)), M makes the following queries to O: does there exist
a strategy profile s that is an SSE and the sum of expected payments of all provers u(x, s) is in the
ith interval? Let L denote the set of intervals for which the answer to the query is “yes”.
For each interval [ℓ/4α(n), (ℓ+1)/4α(n)) ∈ L, M queries O: does there exist a strategy profile s
that is an SSE and the sum of expected payments of all provers u(x, s) is in the first half of the ℓth
interval? If the answer is “yes”, thenM recurses on the first half, elseM recurses on the second half
of the interval. In polynomial time and polynomial queries, M can find the exact total expected
payment u(x, s, (V, ~P )) in the interval that is generated by an SSE.M asks further queries to figure
out the exact payment profile under such an SSE. For k ∈ {1, . . . , p(n)}, where p(n) is the total
number of provers in (V, ~P ), and for each j ∈ {1, . . . , nk
′
}, where nk
′
is the running time of V (k′ is
a constant), M asks the following queries adaptivily: under an SSE where
∑p(n)
i=1 µi(x, s) = u(x, s),
what is the jth bit in the expected payment µk(x, s) of prover Pk, given and the first j − 1 bits of
µk(x, s) and µ1(x, s), . . . , µk−1(x, s). In O(n
k′p(n)) queries, M can figure out the exact payment
profile u˜(x, s) = (µ1, (x, s) . . . , µk(x, s)) under an SSE s, such that the total expected payment is
in the ℓth interval.
M now verifies whether the SSE corresponding to the payment profile u˜(x, s) satisfies the
condition of Observation 12. M proceeds in two phases: first, M wants to go “top-down” figuring
out what part of the game tree is being played under s on input x, using the oracle to simulate
the provers and the verifier. Then, it goes “bottom-up” in the tree being played under s, to check
whether all subforms are “(1/α(n))-close” to the dominant strategy at that subform.
Top-down phase. Let k(n) be the total number of rounds in (V, ~P ). Note that k(n) is polynomial
in n. Let mij denote the message sent by prover Pi at round j. Then, for each round j and each
prover i where 1 ≤ j ≤ k(n) and 1 ≤ k ≤ p(n),M first asks the oracle to give the “pruned” O(α(n))
support distribution imposed by the Nature move of V at round j bit by bit as follows: “under an
SSE where the expected payment profile is u˜(x, s), what is the rth bit of the distribution imposed by
V ′ using V and Lemma 13?” This requires a polynomial number of bits (and therefore queries)
because the distribution is polynomial sized. The pruned distribution preserves the dominant SSE
and changes the utility gap by only a factor 2 (this factor does not affect the proof as our intervals
are scaled down to handle it). Given this distribution, M simulates V on the support of the
distribution to figure out the messages that V sends to the provers in round j. In particular, M
does not have access to random bits, so instead it simulates every action of V in the support. To
14To include 1 as a possible reward, interval 4α(n)− 1 should be closed on both sides; we ignore this for simplicity.
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simulate the provers at round j,M similarly queries O bit by bit: “under an SSE where the expected
payment profile is u˜(x, s), what is the rth bit of the message sent by Pk”. Thus, after simulating
the moves of V and P under s, M has sketched out the O(α(n)) size part of the game tree being
played under s corresponding to u˜(x, s).
Bottom-up phase. Given the O(α(n)) nodes of the game tree under play, M can mark out the
subforms reachable under s corresponding to u˜(x, s). Going from the last level up, for each subform
HI reachable under s,M uses the oracle to figure out which payment interval the expected payments
of the weakly-dominant SSE on HI lie in (given the expected weakly-dominant SSE payments on
the reachable subforms verified so far), until it finds a subform that violates the condition of
Observation 12.
In particular, for each subform HI of height k, let u˜(x, s, I
′) denote the tuple of total expected
payments under s on all subforms HI′ of height < k following I (conditioned on reaching I) verified
so far. M divides the interval [−1, 1] into 8α(n) intervals of size α(n)/4 as before and for each
interval queries the oracle O: does there exist a strategy profile sI on subagme HI that is an SSE
and the sum of expected payments of all provers u(x, s, I) is in the xth interval, and gets a total
expected payments on subforms HI′ of height < k following I equal to u˜(x, s, I
′).15
Then, M finds the maximum interval [i/4α(n), (i+1)/4α(n)) among the intervals for which the
oracle says yes. By Lemma 18, the weakly-dominant SSE smaxI at HI also lies in the ith interval.
Using the probability pI assigned by HI (M knows the distribution imposed by all “pruned” Nature
moves), M checks whether the total expected payment of weakly-dominant SSE smaxI is in the same
interval as the sum of expected payments of provers in ZI under s. If it is not, then s fails the test
and M continues to the next interval in L. Otherwise, M continues to the next reachable subform.
If s passes the test for all subforms (including at the root), then by Observation 12, the answer
bit under s is correct. M ’s final query to O is: “under an SSE where the expected payment profile
is u˜(x, s), what is the answer bit c? If c = 1, then M accepts x, otherwise M rejects x.
M is guaranteed to find a payment profile u˜(x, s) (and thus a strategy profile s) that passes the
test. Since (V, ~P ) is an ncRIP protocol for L, there exists a dominant SSE s∗ in some interval in
L. By Obversation 12, if a strategy profile s′ fails the test, the dominant SSE can not get a total
expected payment in the same interval as s′. Thus, we can rule out intervals by checking any SSE
with total expected payment in that interval. Since a dominant SSE s∗ exists, M must eventually
find an interval, where the corresponding SSE passes the test.
To complete the proof, we note that (a) M runs in polynomial time, (b) each query to the oracle
is polynomial, and, (c) the oracle queries can be answered in non-deterministic exponential time.
First, (a) holds because each top-down and bottom-up phase is executed O(α(n)) times and
each of the phases take polynomial time. In the top-down phase, M simulates the protocol on
strategy s using the oracle while restricting the verifier’s Nature moves to be of O(α(n)) support.
Thus this phase takes polynomial time. For the bottom-up phase, M finds weakly-dominant SSEs
at each reachable subforms under s. Since there are at most O(α(n)) subforms and at most O(α(n))
interval queries for each subform, the bottom-up phase takes time polynomial in n.
Second, (b) holds each oracle query involves a total expected payment u˜(x, s) or an interval of
size α(n)/2, both of which can be generated by V and hence are polynomial in n.
To prove (c), it is sufficient to show that an NEXP machine can guess a strategy profile and
verify if it is an SSE and if it gets expected payments in a certain interval. Since the transcript of
any ncRIP protocol is polynomial in n, a strategy profile s of the provers can be represented in ex-
15M does not need to send the total expected payments of the subforms at lower levels. Instead, M can just send
the total expected payment u(x, s) at the root and ask O to guess s as well. An NEXP can verify if one SSE weakly
dominates another. This observation is crucial in extending this proof to exponential utility gap.
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ponential bits, and thus O can guess such an s. Now given s and the protocol (V, ~P ), by Lemma 26,
it is possible to verify whether s is an SSE of the game in time linear in the size of the game tree,
and thus exponential in n. Furthermore, it can compute the expected payments of the provers
under s in exponential time as well, which is sufficient to answer all the queries made by M .
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